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However, the court reasoned that were it to conclude that the
sniff constituted a search, it would have been proper because the
"[s]heriffs had sufficient information to support a reasonable
suspicion that the package contained contraband." 1104 Therefore,
the Offen court declared that it did not have to determine whether
the x-ray constituted an illegal search because the sniff
"constituted probable cause that the package contained narcotics
and thus was sufficient to support the issuance of the
warrant." 1105

Therefore, under the New York State Constitution, unlike its
federal counterpart, a canine sniff will most likely be determined
to be a search. However, if the court finds that the police acted
with sufficient information to formulate a claim of probable
cause, then the warrantless sniff will be deemed proper and is
sufficient to support the subsequent issuance of a search warrant.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT

People v. 1aiman 1106
(decided January 29, 1991)

A criminal defendant claimed that his right to be protected
against illegal searches and seizures under the state 1107 and
federal 110 8 constitutions was violated when the police, lacking
under the fourth amendment. The court stated that "[s]ince the dog does

nothing more than smell the air surrounding the luggage in order to detect
odors emanating from that luggage, there was no intrusion or search of the
luggage." Id. at 561, 431 N.E.2d at 269, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
1103. 54 N.Y.2d 557, 431 N.E.2d 267, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1981).
1104. Offen, 78 N.Y.2d at 1091, 585 N.E.2d at 372, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
1105. Id. at 1091, 585 N.E.2d at 372, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 123 (citing People v.
Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990)).
1106. 169 A.D.2d 589, 565 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 78
N.Y.2d 968, 580 N.E.2d 419, 574 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1991).
1107. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
1108. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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reasonable suspicion, pursued him and subsequently seized the
gun he discarded as well as the bullets they found on his person.
The court concluded that the plain clothed officers were not
justified in their pursuit and seizure of the defendant when the
defendant looked towards their unmarked patrol car, placed his
hand inside his waistband and ran inside an abandoned building,
holding that these observations "did not attain the level of
'reasonable suspicion' of criminal activity." 110 9 Thus, the gun
and bullets were suppressed as the "fruits of an unlawful
seizure." 1110
Four plain clothed officers were on patrol in an unmarked car
in a known drug area for the purpose of detecting and preventing
possible street crimes. As they drove near an abandoned building,
they observed the defendant, Jaiman, with two or three other
persons, standing near the top of a stoop. Once the car was
within twenty feet of the building, the defendant looked in its
direction. He then shoved his right hand into his waistband and
"turned [and] ran into the building. The others on the stoop also
ran into the building. '"'1n At no time did the officers see a gun
or a bulge in the area of Jaiman's waistband.
The officers pursued the group into the building. Officers Lent
and Harris followed the defendant down a dimly lit hallway,
where he suddenly stopped. At the suppression hearing, Officer
Lent testified that he was approximately fifteen feet from the defendant when he "heard the sound of a heavy metal object hitting
the ground" near where the defendant was standing. 1112 The de1109. Jaiman, 169 A.D.2d at 590, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
1110. Id. at 589, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See also People v. Lawrence, 145
A.D.2d 375, 536 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1st Dep't 1988), appeal granted, 73 N.Y.2d
898, 535 N.E.2d 1350, 538 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1989). InLawrence, plain clothed

police in an unmarked car responded to a radio call that shots had been fired at
a specific address. Upon arrival, the defendant, after making eye contact with
the police, bolted into the building. The court held that the eye contact and
subsequent flight into the building did not give the police reasonable suspicion
that the defendant committed a crime. Id. at 377-78, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
Therefore, the police pursuit and the stop and frisk of the defendant were

"unsupportable," resulting in suppression of the evidence obtained. Id.
1111. Jaiman, 169 A.D.2d at 589, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 14.

1112. Id. at 590, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
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fendant then turned around and slowly walked towards the exit,
passing Officer Lent on his way. Officer Harris stopped the defendant in the hallway, frisked him and discovered seven bullets
in his pants pocket. Meanwhile, Officer Lent found a loaded .38
caliber revolver on a staircase some twelve feet below where the
defendant had been standing. 1 11 3 The defendant was subsequently
convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. 11

14

The court, in an unanimous decision, reversed the defendant's
conviction. The court stated that in evaluating the correctness of
the police action, it must consider "whether [the police action]
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances giving rise
1 15
to the encounter." 1
After reviewing the record the court concluded that the
"objectively credible observations and beliefs of the police officers did not attain the level of 'reasonable suspicion' of criminal
activity or that the officers were in danger of physical injury,
' 1116
necessary predicates for the pursuit and frisk of defendant."
Instead, the court stated that, at most, the police had only a common law right to inquire11 17 because the officers "did not act
upon reliable confirmed information that a crime had occurred or
1113. Id.

1114. Id. at 589, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
1115. Id. at 590, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
1116. Id. at 590-91, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15.
1117. Id. at 591, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 15. In People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210,
352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976), the court stated that the common
law right to inquire is "activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot and permits a somewhat greater intrusion in that a policeman is

entitled to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory
information, but short of seizure." Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 385. See also New York's "stop and frisk" law, which states:
In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest

without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place
located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when
he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or
is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in
the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an
explanation of his conduct.
N.Y. CRai. PRoc. LAW § 140.50(1) (McKinney 1981).
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1118
was about to occur. Nor did they observe criminal conduct."
Rather, the court concluded, the police were "confronted with
conduct by [the] defendant just as susceptible of an innocent interpretation as of a culpable interpretation." 11 19 Therefore, the
defendant had a constitutional right not to respond to the police
inquiry and "may walk, or even run away and without probable
cause, the police may not pursue, search or seize such
person." ' 1120 Therefore, suppression of the evidence was
warranted and the defendant's indictment was dismissed.
The Jaiman decision comports with current New York decisional law. In People v. Howard,112 1 the court held that the
police "may not pursue, absent probable cause to believe that the
individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
crime, seize or search the individual or his possessions, even
though he ran away." 1122 The court further held that when the
individual is cornered by his pursuers in a building, and while
looking for a means of escape drops or throws a package, he has
not "intentionally abandoned the package so as to make a war112 3
ranfless search and seizure permissible."
The Howard court stated that the question of abandonment,
while partly a matter of property law, is "essentially a matter of
constitutional law." ' 1124 Thus, like all constitutional rights, the
presumption against waiver must be shown by evidence of "'an
intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right or
privilege."' ' 1125 Thus, proof supporting abandonment should give

1118. Jaiman, 169 A.D.2d at 591, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
1119. Id.

1120. Id.
1121. 50 N.Y.2d 583, 408 N.E.2d 908, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1023 (1980).
1122. Id. at 586, 408 N.E.2d at 910, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581. See also
Lawrence, 145 A.D.2d at 377, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 62 (defendant's flight alone

not justification for pursuit without additional indicia of criminal activity).
1123. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d at 586, 408 N.E.2d at 910, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
In Jaiman, the door at the end of the hallway was sealed shut, thus, the
defendant could not escape without passing the pursuing officers. 169 A.D.2d
at 590, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
1124. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d at 593, 408 N.E.2d at 915, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
1125. Id. (quoting Foulke v. New York Cons. R.R. Co., 228 N.Y. 269,
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rise to "the exclusive inference of the throwing away." 112 6
In People v. Cantor,112 7 the court stated that in order for the
courts to consider the propriety of the search and the resulting

admissibility of the evidence subsequently acquired, the focus
must be "on the initial seizure of the defendant's person
...."1128 The Cantorcourt defined "seizure" as the physical or
constructive detention of an individual "by virtue of a significant
interruption of his liberty of movement as a result of police action
... ."1129 Thus, if it is found that the stop of the defendant is
unlawful, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop would be
suppressed "absent an independent establishment of probable
0
cause." 113
According to Cantor, determining whether a seizure is reasonable "requires weighing the government's interest in the detection
and apprehension of criminals against the encroachment involved
with respect to an individual's right to privacy and personal security.' 1131 In conducting such an inquiry, the court "must con273, 127 N.E. 237, 238 (1920)).
1126. Id.In People v. Boodle, 47 N.Y.2d 398, 391 N.E.2d 1329, 418
N.Y.S.2d 352, cert.. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979), the court found that there
was no abandonment when an individual discards an object as "a spontaneous
reaction to a sudden and expected confrontation with police." Id. at 404, 391
N.E.2d at 1332, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 356. See also People v. Bennett, 170
A.D.2d 516, 517, 566 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317 (2d Dep't) (defendant did not
abandon pouch containing crack when he discarded it while fleeing from police
as it was a spontaneous reaction to sudden and unexpected confrontation with
police), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 958, 573 N.E.2d 580, 570 N.Y.S.2d 492
(1991).
1127. 36 N.Y.2d 106, 342 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1975).
1128. Id.; at 111, 324 N.E.2d at 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
1129. Id.; see also People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 216, 352 N.E.2d
562, 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1976) (definition of seizure of person for
constitutional purposes means significant interruption of liberty of movement);
People v. McPherson, 165 A.D.2d 818, 819, 560 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (2d
Dep't 1990) (for constitutional purposes, seizure is defined as significant
interruption of movement).
1130. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d at 111, 324 N.E.2d at 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
1131. Id. at 111, 324 N.E.2d at 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 514. The Cantor
court noted that the purpose of "[t]he proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures is... to prevent random, unjustified interference with
private citizens .... ." Id. at 112, 324 N.E.2d at 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
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sider whether or not the action of the police was justified at its
inception and whether or not it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 1132
Furthermore, the Cantor court defined reasonable suspicion as
"the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily
prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe
criminal activity is at hand." ' 1133 Consequently, the police officer
must be able to articulate specific facts that prompted him or her
to intrude on the individual's person in order to act under
1134
reasonable suspicion.

If reasonable suspicion is lacking it does not mean that the police officer cannot approach an individual suspected of criminal
activity. Instead, the New York courts recognize a common law
right to inquire that "is activated by a founded suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot and permits a ...

policeman.

. .

to in-

terfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory
information, but short of forcible seizure." ' 1135 While the police
1132. Id. at 111, 324 N.E.2d at 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 514. In People v.
Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1978), the
court stated that although subsequent events may prove an officer's hunch
correct, hindsight alone should not provide the governing criteria as it would
result in the deterioration of "a vital constitutional safeguard of our personal
security ...... Id. at 565, 373 N.E.2d at 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97. The
court further reasoned that "[a]Imost any series of indiscriminate seizures is
bound to produce some instances of criminality that might otherwise have gone
undetected or unprevented." Id. at 565, 373 N.E.2d at 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d at
997.
1133. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d at 112-13, 324 N.E.2d at 877, 365 N.Y.S.2d at
516.
1134. Id. at 113, 324 N.E.2d at 877, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 516. In People v. De
Bour, the court argued that police officers cannot seize individuals, physically
or constructively, without some articulable justification. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d
at 216, 352 N.E.2d at 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380. In so doing, the court
"rejected the notion that behavior which is susceptible of innocent as well as
culpable interpretation, will constitute probable cause." Id.
1135. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
385. See also Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d at 114, 324 N.E.2d at 878, 365 N.Y.S.2d at
517 (minimum requirement for lawful detentive stop is founded on suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot); McPherson, 165 A.D.2d at 819, 560 N.Y.S.2d
at 162-63 (common law right to inquire permits limited interference with
defendant's liberty provided officer had founded suspicion that criminal
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have this right to inquire, the Howard court noted that an individual also has the constitutional right not to respond. 113 6 Not
only may that individual remain silent, he or she may also walk
or run away, and absent probable cause, the police may not
113 7
pursue, search or seize that individual.

In California v. Hodari,113 8 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a seizure occurs with respect to a
show of authority by police even though the subject of the police
pursuit does not yield. The Court held that it did not. 1139 In
Hodari, the police observed a group of youths, including the
defendant, huddled around a car parked at the curb. Once the
youths saw the unmarked police car approaching, they fled. One
of the officers pursued the defendant on foot, taking a circuitous
route, bringing the defendant and the officer face to face. The
defendant did not see the officer until the officer was almost upon
him. Just before he was tackled by the officer, the defendant
1140
discarded a rock which turned out to be crack cocaine.
The defendant sought to suppress the crack as the fruit of an
illegal seizure. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant
was not seized until he was tackled by the police officer and,
therefore, the cocaine abandoned while fleeing was not the fruit
of an illegal seizure. 1 14 1 The Court rejected the defendant's claim
that the police officer's show of authority when shouting "halt"
restrained the defendant's liberty, thus constituting a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 1142
activity is afoot).

1136. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d at 590, 408 N.E.2d at 913, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
1137. l at 586, 408 N.E.2d at 910, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
1138. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
1139. Id. at 1550.

1140. Id. at 1549.
1141. Id. at 1552. The Court noted that the State of California conceded that
the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify stopping the defendant.
Id. at 1549 n.1. However, the Court thought it contradicted "proverbial

common sense" to consider it unreasonable to stop, even for a brief inquiry,
youths who flee upon the sighting of police. Id.
1142. Id. at 1550. The defendant was relying on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968), where the Court concluded that "[o]nly when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
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Instead, the Court argued that the common law defined seizure
as "not merely grasping, or applying physical force to, the animate or inanimate object in question, but actually bringing it
within physical control." 114 3
The Court also rejected the defendant's reliance on United
States v. Mendenhall.1144 The Mendenhall test provided that "a
person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave." 1145 However, the Hodari Court stated that the
defendant failed to read the test carefully. It argued that
Mendenhall established an objective test for seizure effected by a
"show of authority" and, thus, the defendant's subjective perception of restriction of liberty by the officer's words is
irrelevant. 1 14 6 Furthermore, the Court stated that the Mendenhall
test only "states a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for
seizure ...."1147
The Hodari Court, while declaring that the defendant abandoned the crack cocaine while fleeing from the police, 1148 did
not define when abandonment occurs. In Abel v. United
States, 1149 the Court stated that when a person throws away
personal property without the intent to reclaim it, it is deemed
abandoned. 1150 Therefore, in United States v. Jones,115 1 the test

for abandonment of personal property was described as "whether
an individual has retained any reasonable expectation of privacy
in the object.11 5 2 Furthermore, the "existence of police pursuit
citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Id. at 19 n. 16.
1143. Hodari, 111 S.Ct. at 1549-50.
1144. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
1145. Id. at 554. The Court listed some probable circumstances constituting

a seizure including "the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Id.
1146. Hodari, 111 S.Ct. at 1551.
1147. Id.

1148. Id. at 1552.
1149. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).

1150. Id. at 241.
1151. 707 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983).
1152. Id. at 1172.
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. . . at the time of abandonment does not of itself render the
abandonment involuntary." 115 3
Yet, in dicta, the Court implied that it would have been willing
to permit, as reasonable, the pursuit of an individual fleeing upon
sight of the police because only "[t]he wicked flee when no man
pursueth. ' ' 115 4 Therefore, the subsequent seizure of the individual would not have violated the rules proscribed in Teny v.
Ohio.1 155
In Terry, the Court stated that the police can make an investigative stop of a person which will not constitute an unlawful
seizure providing the "officer's action was justified at its
inception, and [that] it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." ' 1156 However, this reasonable suspicion must be
supported by articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. 115 7
This requires that the officer make specific reasonable inferences
drawn from the facts in light of his experience, and not base his
actions on an "unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."' 115 8
Consequently, under federal law, especially after the Court's
decision in Hodari, an individual fleeing from the police is not
seized until he or she is apprehended by physical force regardless
of whether the pursuit is reasonable. Thus, any objects discarded
during the pursuit are admissible into evidence. Conversely, under New York law, when a person flees a police presence, the
subsequent police pursuit, absent other reasonable suspicion, may
render the seizure illegal and, thus, objects discarded during the
pursuit will not be admitted into evidence. However, because
Jaiman preceded Hodari, there may be a change in approach to
this issue by the New York courts.
1153. Id.; see also United States v. Anderson, 754 F. Supp. 442, 443-44
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (the court stated that in order for the pistol the defendant
discarded while fleeing the police to be suppressed, he "must show he was

forced to dispose of it by the unlawful conduct of the officers.") Id. at 444.
1154. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. at 1549 n.1 (quoting Proverbs 28:1).
1155. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

1156. Id. at 20, 30.
1157. Id. at 21.

1158. Id. at 27.
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